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Abstract
Crowdfunding is an emerging international financial
activity often performed via internet mediated platform.
With the rapid growth of this financial system, rising
risks would influence participant’s decision making. In
this study, we examine the process of a typical
crowdfunding activity, pre-ordering pledging as well as
its coming risks. Based on the analysis, we combine
Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) and General Bass
Model (GBM) to build decision-making models for
pre-ordering pledging theoretically where risk factors
are taken into account. Finally, evolutionary game
simulation system is built to simulate the dynamic
decision-making behavior in a risk changing
environments. The simulation results demonstrate that
the currency exchange rate give great impact on
international participant’s decision-making behavior in
crowdfunding. Low exchange rate brings less
investment decision from the investor and high
exchange rate leads to overheated investment which
challenges funder’s diligence. Project system risk
may infest the participant’s decisions-making process
and cause ambiguity at the end. Limitation and
managerial suggestions are discussed.

1. Introduction
With the development of internet technology and
internet finance, new firms and creative projects find a
new way to raise money through an internet platforms
called crowdfunding platform. It allows the funders to
collect money from a great number of individuals;
meanwhile the individuals can invest any creative
projects presented in the crowdfunding platform. The
concept
of
crowdfunding
developed
from
crowdsourcing, which collects information, funds and
idea resources from individuals. It allows the public
participates in different programs through the internet
platform. Recent years, crowdfunding has attracted
investors’ attention for several reasons. It not only
achieves self-satisfactory for personal interests, but is
also associated with production priority, project
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involving, future benefit and control power [1, 2].
It is widely believed that crowdfunding has great
potency to benefit innovation [3], entrepreneurship [4],
sustainability [5] and smart cities [6]. With the rapidly
development of internet finance, crowdfunding plays
an increasingly important role in economy. Thus,
crowdfunding platforms develop rapidly and globally.
In 2014, the most famous crowdfunding site,
Kickstarter, has attracted 7.7 million investors all over
the world to help launching 77,000 creative projects [7].
Furthermore, the total number of international
crowdfunding projects is also increasing every year [8].
However, potential risks arise when crowdfunding is in
a rapid expansion. The participating motivations in
crowdfunding have attracted many scholars’ attention
[9]. Decision-making process in crowdfunding has
become an important research area in recent years.
Transaction costs, reputation, market design [10], and
geographic factors [11] are believed to be of
significance on decision-making process. Various
potential risks may have great influence on investor’s
decision-making process in crowdfunding. However,
most of the recent studies for decision-making under
risk analysis focused on the perspectives of laws [12]
or historical cases [13] qualitatively. It is necessary to
analyze the decision-making process with risk factors
in crowdfunding quantitatively for the purpose of
understanding to what extent risk factors influence the
decision-making process and how decision makers
respond to the changes in risk factors.
In this paper, we analyze the risks theoretically
and develop typical analytical decision-making models
for crowdfunding. An evolutionary game simulation
system is built to simulate the dynamic
decision-making process for crowdfunding activities in
risk changing environments based on system dynamics
in order to analyze the impact of risks on
decision-making behavior quantitatively.

2. Related works
2.1 Decision making in pledging
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In the studies of decision-making in pledging,
researchers believe that pre-ordering pledging is
preferred in the early period when pledging demand is
smaller than its market size, or the profit-sharing is
preferred [14]. Promise of long-term benefit and
illustration of the project’s social attributes play a
crucial role in project financing [15]. In addition,
Kuppuswamy and Bayus [16] pointed out supportive
investors’ increment is negative related to the existing
investors. Although these researches tried to analyze
decision makers’ behavior, they mainly focused on
successful investment behavior and ignored the risks
that brought to crowdfunding. In crowdfunding, mass
individuals make decisions with more efficient
information and experience, which requires the study to
consider multiple conditions.
Risk investigation is also worth noticing while
success factors are studied, so that the issues could be
analyzed objectively. Therefore, it would be reasonable
and necessary to ask the following two questions. What
is the impact of risk factors on crowdfunding activities?
And how participants react according to the alteration
of risk factors? This study will analyze the risk factors
in crowdfunding on the base of classical theoretical
model, in order to fill the gap in theoretical risk
research.

2.2 General Bass Model
The Bass Model [17], refer as the General Bass
Model (GBM), is a classical method which could be
used to analysis adoption and substitution for
successive generations of high-technology products
[18]and new products [19]. In GBM, the parameters
can be estimated, and fitting without decision variables,
therefore, GBM has been widely used in empirical
studies [20, 21]. Today, Bass model is still widely used
in the research of innovation, technology diffusion and
marketing. Kumar [22] proposed energy models to
enhance knowledge and skills in the efficient transfer
and management of technology for optimally allocating
different types of technology feasibility Bertorri [23]
introduced a network structure into the Bass Model and
investigated numerically the dynamics in the case of
networks with different link density. In information age,
Bass Model also fits to capture the underlying
mechanism of information diffusion on SNS (Social
Network Site). Shen [24] figures out that the Basic
Bass Model captures the underlying mechanism of
topic development process of the SNS such as Twitter.
Although GBM has various advantages in the
study of purchasing new products or adopting
technologies, the perspective of GBM is unidirectional.
It cannot provide a research path on the sale side. In

order to expand the applications of GBM, other
classical methods are combined with GBM. Combined
with Grey theory, more effective and accurate forecast
can be made [25]. Combined with simulation, the
research works based on Bass Model not only focus on
forecast but also has been proved effective under
different contexts [26]. In the study of decision making,
GBM may combine with another suitable model to
analyze diffusion problem on internet.

2.3 Evolutionary Stable Strategy
Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) is the basic
concept in Evolutionary Game Theory, which was
originally considered for biological evolution, but now
is widely used in behavioral ecology and economics. It
considers a large population of bounded rational
players playing a game repeatedly through time, and
players learn from the experience to improve their
strategy [27, 28]. ESS has theoretical and practical
guidance in digital age. Recently, ESS was used to
analyze construction safety investment [29], trust
decision, adaptive selection of cryptographic protocols
in WSNs (Wireless Sensor Networks), and resource
allocation, etc. Shen [30] studied the dynamics of a
sensor node making a trust decision that will determine
whether to cooperate with others, with the purpose of
disclosing this evolutionary process. Based on
Evolutionary Game Theory, Arora [31] propose an
adaptive security model for WSNs to select
cryptographic protocols during runtime. When
considering an effective way to employ D2D
communications for secondary users, Cheng [33]
adopted replicator dynamics in Evolutionary Game
Theory to model the users’ behaviors.
Compared to the classical game theory,
Evolutionary Game is more suitable for studying the
problem in digital age. Thus, the ESS can possibly
address the mass decision making issues with less
asymmetric information on the internet, such as
crowdfunding. However, this theory does not offer
efficient method to address the problems of decision
making mutation in the game.

3. Crowdfunding and risk analysis

3.1 Framework of crowdfunding
Crowdfunding Platform (CFP) is an online site
that allows funders to show projects on it for raising
money. Funders provide information of the
crowdfunding projects, such as business plans, photos,
and videos and updated processing information when
the crowdfunding application is approved by the
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platform. The backers, who are interested in the
crowdfunding projects, could get the information from
the CFP and decide to invest/purchase them or not.
Pre-ordering
ordering pledging is a typical and preferred
pledging form in crowdfunding
rowdfunding. In pre-ordering
pledging, investors receive the confirmation of
products/services from funders after purchasing the
project. Investors are able to evaluate the received
products/services as well as share their purchase
experience
ence on crowdfunding platform, project
community or SNS. If most of the purchase
experiences are positive, other investors will be more
likely to purchase this project. Otherwise, their desires
to purchase the project will decline.
Figure 1 shows the process
ss of pre-ordering
pre
pledging in crowdfunding. If a backer chooses to
purchase or invest a project, the data will be recorded
on CFP.

Figure 1 Process of pre-ordering
ordering pledging
CFP is a workplace for information transaction
and data saving, which helps funders and backers to
match each other. By pledging, backers gain stock
share and chance to participate in program managing,
such as selecting stockholder representative to
guarantee the normal operation of the project and the
expected dividend, and finally receive the return.
However, in some non-profit
profit projects, backer’s
backer
investment could be considered as donation or charity.
This case will not be discussed in this paper. In this
process, backers can learn from each other’s experience
(Exp.),, so do the funders. With CFP, both backers and
funders can get more information (Info.) in the repeated
crowdfunding from each side.

3.2 Risk analysis in crowdfunding
Risk factors in crowdfunding
Due to its special business process and mode, the
rapid growth and internationalization of crowdfunding
bring two major investment risks which caused by
environmental factors and business factors, respectively.
Most of the projects in crowdfunding are related to
technology and art. Investors are relatively dispersive
and have personal motivations for investment.
Consequently, the risks brought by environmental

factors do not bring serious threats. Compared to
environmental factors, business factors bring more
risks but they are are easier to be managed and
recognized by carrying out risk management. CFP
should effectively prevent the risks brought by business
factors, or they will lead to develop restrictions and
even industry recession. Generally, risks
r
of business
factors in crowdfunding are uncertainties of
participants,, projects and pledging process, including
information security, backer’s decision-making
decision
behavior, funder’s credit and operating ability. Factors
related to project pledging may also bring risks in
investment, such as the return rate, investment
threshold, and currency exchange rate when foreign
backers invest the project.
Risk management in crowdfunding platform
Crowdfunding platform has taken measures to
deal with the potential risk caused by business factors.
1) Risk management before pledging: Projects
Selection
Before the pledging project is established, funders
are required to provide real personal, credit
information and valid introduction about the
pledging project. CFP will verify all the applied
crowdfunding projects and reject high risking
projects to guarantee a high success ratio of the
crowdfunding projects.
2) Risk management during
ing pledging: financing rules.
rules
When the project is established, CFP will control
the overall risk of the project by applying the
financing systems. There are two systems in
financing form: All or Nothing (AoN) and Keep it
All (KiA).Under AoN system, mon
money is collected
from contributors if a pre-determined
pre
target has
been achieved. If the goal is not met, no money is
collected. In KiA, all of the money is collected
without return regardless of the pledging goal is
achieved or not [33].
3) Risk management after pledging: information
disclosure
If a project has pledged enough money, funders are
required to update the project’s latest information
and post the information in the most conspicuous
places to capture backers’ attention. Funders can
also pass the latest information, texts, pictures and
video clips to the backers on his SNS, in the
project’s community or by other interaction
channels.

4. Decision-making
crowdfunding

model

for

In crowdfunding, backers and funders make
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decisions as a repeated game. Individual decision
maker interact and exchange information with each
other through SNS, CFP and other interaction assisted
tools. He or she learns from others’ experiences again
and again to form his or her own decisions. Backers
make decisions with the help of experience learned
from feedback. Funders can also notice the reaction of
backers when feedback is received by the backers.
More details of decision-making process will be
considered in the typical crowdfunding game model.

4.1 Combination of ESS and GBM
In the pledging game process, what we are facing
is a multi-objective decision-making problem. Both
funders and backers have to be considered together and
each side’s decision-making is affected by the other
side.
GBM can be used to analyze internet related
problem with the condition of mass decision making.
Thus, it is suitable for modeling the group decision
making behaviors. However, as discussed, the
perspective of GBM is unidirectional; it cannot provide
a research path on the funder side in the process of
crowdfunding. It cannot be used to analyze the related
influence between two decision-making groups (bakers
and funders) in crowdfunding. As we mentioned above,
the decision-making process in crowdfunding is
regarded as a game. Compared to other approaches,
ESS takes a large population of bounded rational
players into consideration, which just meet our
requirements and is a suitable strategy to provide
solutions for multi-objective decision-making problem
in game. Therefore, we consider using GBM to build
the multi-objective group decision-making model and
applying an evolution based game ESS to improve the
decision-making model as well.
Based on GBM, we argue that the general
equation for describing the process of adopting new
products in population could also model the
per-ordering decision making behavior for purchasing
new products or services in crowdfunding.
f t 
 p  qF  t 
(1)
1  F t 
Where f  t  is the rate for change of the purchase
penetration, F(t) is the purchase penetration, p is the
coefficient of innovation and q is the coefficient of
imitation.
Then we introduce an evolutionary based game,
ESS. In this game, there are two strategies S1 and S2
for backer. S1denotes “purchase” and S2 denotes “not
purchase”, x is the proportion to choose purchase
with mass backers. Similarly, y is the proportion to

choose the first strategy for funders in a mass. Refer to
the replicator dynamic [34] as the strategy reply in ESS,
the replicator dynamic equation for backers is:
dx
(2)
 x E1  E  x 1  x  u1  u2 
dt
Where t is the time, u1 is the revenue of S1, u2





is the revenue of S2, x is the proportion of backers
who choose purchase (S1), E1 is the expected revenue
of S1, E is the average expected revenue of the
population. Based on the above discussion, we notice
that x and F(t) have the similar meaning. Set x=F(t),
the replicator dynamic can be expressed as:
dx
(3)
F   t   f  t    F  t  1  F  t   u1  u2 
dt
From equation (1), the rate of change of the
purchase penetration be expressed as:
f  t   F  t  1  F  t  q  1  F  t   p

(4)

If  u1  u2   q , equation (3) and equation (4)
would have the same expression form. In the GBM, q is
the coefficient of imitation in GBM which represents
external factors for purchasing a new product.
Moreover, (u1  u2 ) is the extra revenue of purchasing
which also represents one kind of external factors.
Theoretically, replicator dynamic can be explained as
the external influence of purchasing decision in the
GBM when revenue is the only external factor
considered. In other words, the replicator dynamic
expresses the imitation of decision makers who learn
from experience revenue receiving, and the extra
revenue expands the changing ratio in decision-making.
Both GBM and ESS have drawbacks. The
replicator dynamic has shown the imitative rule for
bounded rational decision makers with experience,
probably, rational enough for mass backers or funders.
As the bounded rational hypothesis is limited, we will
consider the irrational decision for improvement. The
replicator dynamic needs to be expanded with another
decision-making relationship which does not consider
the revenue as the mutation in the game.
In economics, the decision making without profit
consideration is regarded as irrational. In equation (4),
p is the coefficient of innovation which denotes internal
factors. The innovative purchase was motivated by
individual reasons (internal factors) only. Without
major consideration of profit, p represents irrational
factors. It is noticed that the other part of equation (4),
1  F (t ) p , represents the irrational factors influence
on purchase decision making in economic perspective.
As the game is dynamic, the coefficient of
irrationally decision-making should not be fixed as the
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setting in GBM, but changing with the strategy
proportion which refers to Evolutionary Theory.
Setting the relation of irrationally decision-making and
the proportion of S1 is pP(F(t)), where p is the risk
variable from individuals which shows the uncertain of
irrationally decision-making. P(F(t)) is the relation
function of F(t) and p. pP(F(t))represents the mutation
of strategy choice which does not be considered in the
replicator dynamic equation (2) or (3). In this paper, p
is negatively correlated with the decision consistency,
that is, if the decision makers almost choose the same
strategy, irrationally decision-making behavior will
decrease and everyone’s choice is more profitable.
Based on the above discussion, relation function can be
set as:

P  F t   1  1  2F t 

(5)

Combine equations (3), (4) and (5), the rate of the
purchase penetration changes where both rational and
irrational decisions are considered in a repeated game is
presented as:

f  t   F  t  1 F  t    u1  u2   1 F  t   pP  F  t  

(6)

Substitute equation (5) into (6), we have:



f  t   F  t  1 F  t    u1 u2   1 F  t   p 1 1 2F  t 



(7)

Equation (7) shows a general expression form for mass
decision-making which take both rational and
irrational decisions into consideration in a repeated
game. It is a general discrete decision-making model in
crowdfunding. It will be used for pre-ordering game
modeling later.

4.2 Decision-making modeling for pre-ordering
pledging
Assumptions and parameters used for modeling
Before building the decision-making model for
pre-ordering pledging, we have the following
assumptions.
1) Decision makers are bounded rational.
2) f (t ) presented in equation (6) is used to model the
decision-making changes.
3) For clarity of comparison, all the returns are
calculated as NPV.
4) Information is efficient.
We assume there is infinity of potential backers
(investors or purchasers). Crowdfunding projects are
open to international investment. Backers use domestic
currency DC to invest/purchase the project.
Crowdfunding projects use foreign currency FC as the
settlement currency.
Definition 4.1: Let S B  S B1 , S B 2  be the backer’s

investment strategy SB1 denotes backer’s choice of
investing the project and S B 2 denotes backer’s choice
of not investing the project. The probability of each
choice is denoted by b1 and b2 respectively, b1  b2  1 .
Definition 4.2: Let x be the ratio of backer who accept
the creative project or investment choice. x reflects
backer’s investment decision in crowdfunding.
Definition 4.3: Let S F   S F 1 , S F 2  be the funder’s
service strategy. SF1 denotes high cost and high return
are promised by the funder and S F 2 denotes low cost
and low return. The probabilities of each strategy is
denoted by a1 and a2 , a1  a2  1 .
Definition 4.4: Let y be the ratio of hard-working
funders. y reflects funder’s return decision in
crowdfunding.
Given a crowdfunding project, with m potential
backers, the average investment from backers is C0 ,
the pre-determined target is set to w , and t0 denotes
the time used for pledging, w denotes the actual
amount of capital be raised. The actual pledged capital
is calculated for the two financing systems separately.
In KiA system

w  xt0 mC0

(8)

In AoN system

 xt0 mC0 , xt0 mC0  w
w
(9)
 0, xt0 mC0  w
In pre-ordering pledging modeling, four major
risk factors will be taken into consideration in
decision-making process. They are irrational
decision-making risk from both backers p x and funders

py , currency exchange rate e and pledging system
risk  .
Definition 4.5: Let et be the currency exchange rate at

t,

et  FC / DC .  t is the change of et at time t , e0 is
t

the initial rate, et  e0    t .
0

Pre-ordering Game modeling
This study chooses Kickstarter’s working mode to
launch decision-making modeling. As the most famous
pre-ordering crowdfunding platform, Kickstarter
established in U.S. and it is the largest synthesized
crowdfunding platform. In 2014, 3.3 million people
that all over the world has pledged more than half a
billion dollars (that's $1,000 in every minute) to support
22,252 creative projects. Backers are welcome to invest
their preferred programs via the platform, but only U.S.
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dollars or GB pounds are accepted as the settlement
currency. Therefore, foreign currency exchange rate
may bring risk to the investment of crowdfunding.
Kickstarter adopts the financing mechanism of
AoN.
oN. Funders need to establish a pre-determined
pre
target
and a deadline for the pledging. The raised capital will
be refunded if the target cannot be achieved in time.
Commonly, Kickstarter charge 5% of the fund and
Amazon, the capital operating partner, woul
would collect
another 3-5%.
5%. The pledging project will be recorded
online for reference.
As to the modeling of pre-ordering,
ordering, participants in
Kickstarter are completely in conformity with the
characteristics of repeated gaming. In addition,
database and credit system established by project
recording, provide references for decision makers to
learn from.
This part proposes a pre-ordering
ordering game to analyze
the impact of risks on decision-making.
decision
For the
pre-ordering funders, if the collected
ected capital reaches
reache the
pre-determined target w , the funder w
will get enough
money to reach the most efficiency level and provide
high quality or return

round, backers and funders make decisions from past
experiences and revealed information
information. We use equation
(6) to model decision-making
making changes
changes. The Sequence
of events occurred in the game is presented as follows:
follows
1)
Backers
ackers make their decisions.
decisions
2)
Projects start to raise capital on the crowdfunding
platform.
3)
When pledging is accomplished
accomplished, funders operate
the project and make the return decision.
decision
4)
Backers
ackers receive the return, share
shar the experiences,
and go back to step 1).
Using AoN financing mechanism, projects get
the pledged capital successfully when w  w  .We
assume that successful crowdfunding projects are
more likely to reach the efficiency level in AoN,
consider as   1 . The game tree and the revenue
are shown in Figure 2.

 R  with the minimum cost
H

Cmin . If the collected capital does not reach w , the

 

funder will choose to offer high return R H

 

 

with high

 

cost C H or low return R L with low cost C L . 
denotes the project operation risk factor. In this study, it
is the posterior probability of reaching the efficiency
level in pre-ordering pledging.

C H  C L  Cmin

Figure 2 Pre-ordering
ordering game tree and the
revenue
evenue
In pre-ordering game,

 

(10)
Let f x (t )  0 , here is Fx (t )  1,0 or
y

discrete analogue of the GBM, in this model, time
delay is accurate. Before the game, funders will give
the pre-ordering price C0 in currency FC and the
confirmatory is returned.. Backers do not know the
probability of strategies chosen by funders. In each

C0e0  R L et



et R

H

R

L





p x Px  Fx  t  



Fx  t  et R H  R L

(11)



 C0   Cmin  xm  Fx  t  1  Fx  t  


f y  t   Fy  t  1  Fy  t  

H
L
   1 xm C Fx  t  1  C Fx  t  

 (12)



 1  Fy  t  p y Py Fy  t 



Let f y (t )  0 , here is Fy (t)  1,0 or

is Fx  t  1 , and if the funders choose S F 2 , the
purchase penetration is Fx  t  . It is approximated in the



 1 Fx  t   px Px  Fx  t  

RH  RL
Considering the probability and the process of a
similar lemons problem in crowdfunding, ESS would
change with the time delay in discrete replicator
dynamics. It implies that the probability of choosing
strategy S F 2 will increase with time and the expected
revenue for backers will be reduced, and then the
purchase penetration will be reduced accordingly.
Finally, total revenue for funders is reduced. So that
when the funders choose SF1 , the purchase penetration



f x  t   Fx  t  1 Fx  t  yet RH  RL  RLet  C0e0

x



 p y Py Fy  t 



 C0   Cmin  m  Fx  t  1  Fx  t  Fy  t 

5. Simulation and results analysis
Analytical solution of pre
pre-ordering game implies
that the correlations among ESS, returns and risk
factors are extremely complex. Therefore, we propose a
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numerical case simulation and test the impact of risk
factors on decision-making
making process in pre-ordering
pre
game in the following.

5.1 Simulation model and parameter setting
Based on the system dynamics [35], this paper
builds evolutionary game simulation system to simulate
the dynamic decision-making
making in a risk changing
environments.
Table 1 System parameter settings
Parameters
e
x
y
C0
Cmin
RH
CL
RL
delta e

Settings
Initial value 5
Initial value
0.5
Initial value
0.5
10
0.5*C0
Cmin*2.15
Cmin*1.5
Cmin*1.8
e*RANDOM
UNIFORM(-0
.05,0.05, 0.001)

fx

Follows
equation (10),

fy

Follows
equation (12)
RANDOM
NORMAL(-0.

pxP(x)

01,0.01,0,0.003,
0.005)*(1-ABS(
1-2*x))

RANDOM
NORMAL(-0.
pyP(y)

pi

01,0.01,0,0.003,
0.003 )*(1-ABS
(1-2*y))

0.95*x

Descriptions
Currency exchange rate
Ratio
io of backers who
purchase projects
Ratio of hard-working
funders
Pre
re-ordering price
M
Minimum
cost
High return
Low cost
Low return
Changes of exchange rate
Rate of the “purchase”
penetration changes from
backers
Rate of the “hard working”
penetration changes from
funders
Influence of irrational
decision risk from backers

strategy probability of both sides in pledging game
which are represented by rate variable.
and
denote the speed of change in both sides’ group
strategy probability, which represented by flow rate,
rate
that is, the changes in every decision cycle. e in the box
denotes the exchange rate represented by rate variable,
which is cumulative increasing or declining during a
changing trend. C0 denotes purchase price, and it is a
constant. According to the process in the game tree and
its equation, we can see that every factor gives impact
on
and .
Parameter
arameter setting of the simulation system is
summarized in Table 1. The values of parameters are
set according to the average level of a real normal
market. The initial decision making proportion is set to
0.5 for both backers and funders. This represents a
typical normal game state. Players choose strategies
randomly, because none of them has efficient
informationn or experience to support their decisions.
Particularly, the irrational decision-making
decision
risk factors
are also set as random. The format in parameter settings
follows the coding rules of system dynamics simulation
software, Vensim 5.0. RANDOM NORMAL (Min Max
M
Mean Stdev. Seed) sets the immeasurable risk factor to
be subject to normal distribution with the conditions of
minimum, maximum, mean value, standard deviation
and initial vale. Thus, the numerical case simulation
can be tested with dynamic and uncerta
uncertain risk factors.

5.2 Simulation results
In this section, the simulation results are presented
to analyze the impact of risk factors on
decision-making in pre-ordering
ordering pledging.
Table 2 Influence degree of risk factors

Influence of irrational
decision risk from funders
System risk factor

Risk
factors

Irrational
decision
Exchange
rate
System
risk

Figure 3 Pre-ordering
ordering game simulation system
In the pre-ordering game simulation system as
shown in Figure 3, the arrow denotes one factor
influences another one. x and y in the box denote game

Parameters

Parameter
variation
method

Backer’s
Decision(x)

Funder’s
Decision(y)

px

Exp

NS

N

py

Exp
Raise
Fall

N
P
C

NS
N
EP

Fall

C

C

e



To capture the influence of risk factors on
decision-making,
making, we apply different variation methods
to their corresponding parameters, such as at random
range, different expectations,
expectation risk uncertainties and
degrees. We use six levels to measure the influence
degree of the four major risk factors
factors. They are
Completely change(C), Extremely Negative effect (EN),
Negative effect(N), No Significant effect(NS),Positive
impact(P), Extremely Positive impact(EP). The
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influence degree of each risk factor is shown in Table 2.
The results imply that backer’s irrational decision gives
negative effect on funder’s decision and vice versa.
When currency exchange rate rises, backers are more
likely to make investment decisions and funder’s
intention to offer high return is weak. However, when
currency exchange rate goes down, backers completely
change their investment decisions and funders are more
willing to work hard and provide good services. When
system risk uncertainty increases, both backer and
funder completely change their decisions.
Besides showing the influence degree of each risk
factor on decision making, we further analyze the
backer’s decision-making trend when risk factor is in a
changing situation. In the following figures, horizontal
axis denotes the time and the vertical axis denotes the
strategy penetration of backers and funders. With
standardization, the value of strategy penetration is
controlled and ranges from 0 to 1. 1 means that all the
backers choose to purchase or investment (or all the
funders choose to work hard or offer high return),
otherwise, 0 means that no one chooses to take part in
Crowdfunding. In Figure 4-5, Blue curve denotes the
decision of backer and red one denotes the decision of
funder.
Figure 4 shows backer and funder’s decisions
under bearish currency exchange rate. With bearish
currency exchange rate, there is a rapid decline on
backer’s decision of investing project though the
funders choose high level of effort and provide good
services and high return. In this situation,
crowdfunding will go to the winter period, because no
more backers want to invest the project. There is one
way to break this impasse. Funders need to keep on
providing high service quality and return to backers.
After a period of time, the probability of backers’
investment decision will gradually increase.

exchange rate, backers prefer to make investing
decisions. Meanwhile, due to large amount of backers’
support, funders can choose to make less effort to
maintain the sustained crowdfunding. However, this is
not the most efficient result in crowdfunding activities.
When currency exchange rate becomes bullish, funders
can make less effort, but this is not the result of a
virtuous circle. Figure 5 implies that funders may not
always offer high return in the game.
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rate
Figure 5 shows backer and funder’s decisions
under bullish currency exchange rate. With bullish
currency exchange rate, backers’ decision on investing
project increases. Compared to the situation of stable
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Figure 7 Funder’s decision under financing
mechanisms
Figure 6 shows backer’s decision under the
different financing mechanisms and Figure 7 shows
funder’s decision under different financing mechanisms.
The blue curve denotes backer/funder’s decision under
KiA mechanism and red one denotes backer/funder’s
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decision under AoN mechanism.
Let   1 in the AoN mechanism and   0.7 in
the KiA mechanism. When  decreases from 1 to 0.7,
it implies the financing mechanism is changed from
AoN to KiA. Different mechanism corresponds to
different pledging system risk level. This change
increases the system risk of crowdfunding platform.
Thus, decision-making process of the participants
becomes unpredictable and out of control. Finally, the
game may change repeatedly and take a long time to
reach the ESS. Raising the success probability of
pre-ordering projects may help to offer a low risk
investment environment in crowdfunding platform.
Therefore, more backers will participate in the project,
and successful experience in crowdfunding will be
improved.

6. Discussion and conclusion
6.1 Key findings
As an essential part of internet finance,
crowdfunding plays an increasingly important role in
today’s economy. The success of crowdfunding
depends on participants’ decisions. This paper
combines
two
classical
theories
to
build
decision-making models for pre-ordering pledging,
where risk factors are taken into account. An
evolutionary game simulation system is built to
simulate participants’ dynamic decision-making
behaviors in a risk changing environments. Finally, the
influence of risk factors on participants’ decision
making behaviors is analyzed quantitatively in
crowdfunding. The observations are summarized
below:
1) With the internationalization of crowdfunding,
foreign backers are suffering from the risk caused by
fluctuation in currency exchange rate. When
exchange rate drops, investment decisions made by
foreign backers decline tremendously. In this
situation, foreign backers are not likely to invest the
project on the crowdfunding platform. Without
enough participants, the whole crowdfunding system
becomes hard to operate. While a rise of exchange
rate will lead to overheated investment, which is
caused by the Herd Effect. This may further
challenge funders’ diligence.
2) Increasing the project system risk may lead
participants’ decisions into the process of repeated
mutual testing and cause ambiguity at the end. A
stable decision-making process can be achieved if
only an equilibrium strategy can be found between
funders and backers in the long-term of repeating

game. The evolutionary stable strategies from both
sides determine the final developmental level of the
decision-making process.

6.2 Managerial suggestions
The findings of this study also provide useful
guidance
to
the
crowdfunding
platform
operator/manager who plans to control the risks and
develop better pre-ordering pledging activities. The
managerial suggestions for practices are as follows:
1) Try to spread financial risks, encourage international
backers’ participation as well as promoting
internationalization development of crowdfunding
activities. At the same time, crowdfunding platform
operators need to establish efficient incentive system
and more strict rules to help avoid funders’ lazy
action, which is caused by exchange rate raise and
pre-ordering backers’ overheated investment.
2) Try to control the project system risk by applying
technological means and risk assessment. Guarantee
a favorable investment environment, an honest
atmosphere and a positive growing trend.

6.3 Limitations
This paper has several limitations. We only
analyze the decision-making process of pre-ordering
activity and take four risk factors into account. Another
crowdfunding activity referring to equity pledging
should be considered in future works. The analysis of
mass decision making process is this paper has ignored
the individual characteristics of crowdfunding projects
and participants. Multi-agent simulation may be
suitable to address these issues. In addition, empirical
analysis needs to be taken into account for theoretical
verification.
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